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1 
GLOBALIZATION, LAW & DEVELOPMENT: 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Michael S. Barr* 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah** 
Introduction 
The current period of globalization (defined loosely as increasing 
global economic integration), which began with the liberalization of ex-
change and capital controls and lowering of trade and investment 
barriers in the 1980s, is not the first time the world got economically 
smaller. The period from 1870 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914 
was by some measures (such as the percentage of GNP in developed 
countries derived from overseas investment, and labor migration) marked 
by more extensive globalization than the post-1980 one. This earlier 
globalization came to a halt with the hostilities of World War I, followed 
by the high tariffs and limits on migration in the inter-war period.  
Most observers would agree that globalization can in principle be a 
positive phenomenon and aid human development even if they disagree 
about the extent to which the current wave of globalization has in fact 
been helpful. A key issue in these debates is the extent to which global-
ization widens or narrows the gap between the developed nations and the 
developing world, or at least significantly improves the lot of the devel-
oping world even if it does not narrow the gap. To the extent 
globalization helps bring developing countries up to the standards of de-
veloped countries’ life expectancy, health, education, and overall 
prosperity, most would agree that it should be viewed positively, and that 
a relapse to closed economies like the one that followed World War I 
should be avoided.  
The debate has therefore focused primarily on how globalization can 
be managed in a way that helps development. In this debate, some have 
advocated maximum reliance on free markets, free trade, and laissez 
faire policies in the international arena,1 while others have advocated 
adapting something akin to the “mixed economy” model that is already 
generally applied in the developed countries domestically to  
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international economics, resulting in a bigger role for national or trans-
national regulation of both trade and investment.2 
The role of law in development has become a key focus of this de-
bate in recent years. Yet stale discussion about the importance of law in 
development from a generation ago has largely given way to richly tex-
tured debates about what forms of what law, public administration, 
enforcement, and other institutions, developed where and by whom, 
might improve economic growth how, and for whom.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
market economies in formerly communist countries, policy makers per-
ceived the establishment of the “rule of law” in the domestic arena as a 
crucial and indispensable factor in promoting development.3 It soon be-
came apparent, however, that a simple focus on promulgating good 
formal rules, or launching “anti-corruption” campaigns, was not enough. 
Moreover, following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the WTO and its legalistic dispute resolution mecha-
nism in the mid-90s, law makers realized that legal rules can indeed be 
crafted to govern some aspects of globalization. Those interested in the 
distributive aspects of globalization saw that these rules may be key to 
ensuring that globalization benefits the poor as well as the rich, thus pre-
venting a 1920s-style backlash.4 Others saw these rules as critical to 
keeping distributive issues away from trade, which they viewed as about 
increasing the size of economic pie, not divvying up its pieces. 
The papers in this issue were written for a conference that we and 
our colleague Jan Svejnar convened at the University of Michigan Law 
School in April, 2004 to address some of these issues, which arguably 
are the most pressing problems facing the world in the 21st century. 
Moreover, the gap between developed and developing nations underlies 
a host of other global problems, such as fighting terrorism, managing 
immigration pressures, and protecting the environment.  
The conference was designed to contribute to a debate renewed in the 
last several years on how best to promote development in an era of global-
ization. In some ways, the UN framed the current debate in 2000, by 
setting out a series of far-reaching and concrete “Millennium Develop-
ment Goals,” which aimed to significantly reduce global poverty by 2020. 
In other ways, the current debate has been framed by troubled trade talks. 
After a breakdown between rich and poor countries in Seattle, the latest 
global trade round was launched two years later in Doha by focusing 
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explicitly on a new development agenda. These talks are threatened, 
however, both by a continued lack of market access for developing coun-
tries to some key sectors in industrial countries, such as agriculture, as 
evidenced by the failures of trade negotiations in Cancun in 2003, and an 
increasingly complex set of trade rules that many countries lack the legal 
and institutional competence to navigate. 
We invited a number of experts from a variety of disciplines to dis-
cuss issues related to the links between globalization, development, and 
law. This issue is the result. Below, we summarize the articles and re-
marks published herein, and the offer some observations about areas of 
agreement and disagreement. 
Summary of Proceedings 
The proceedings opened with Robert Kuttner’s keynote speech,5 
which argues in favor of applying a “mixed economy” model to interna-
tional economics, rather than the current preference for laissez faire 
embodied in the Washington Consensus. Kuttner argues that it is incon-
gruous to support a significant role for government regulation in 
domestic economies, as all developed countries do to some extent, while 
leaving international trade and investment unregulated. This situation is 
particularly paradoxical given that globalization itself creates greater 
links between domestic and international economies, and therefore it 
becomes harder to maintain the mixed economy domestically while leav-
ing the international economy unregulated. For example, it has been 
argued that unfettered tax competition to attract investment in the inter-
national arena can potentially undermine the ability of both developed 
and developing countries to finance their domestic social safety net, at a 
time when the pressures of globalization on work and wages render a 
social safety net more necessary than ever.6 According to Kuttner, the 
large question is how to move piecemeal towards global or transnational 
regulation. 
The first panel session, moderated by Jan Svejnar, focused on “the 
purposes of development.” Kamal Malhotra’s piece argues that the pur-
pose of development is “the achievement of the highest level of human 
development for every human being,” and that human development 
should be defined broadly as “a process of enlarging choices.” In his 
view, lots of economic growth is “voiceless, ruthless, rootless, and fu-
tureless.” By contrast, in the human development paradigm, the ultimate 
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objective of development is not to create more wealth or to achieve 
higher economic growth, but to enlarge this range of choices and the 
human capacity to live one’s life. Albert Park and Linda Tesar com-
mented by agreeing with Malhotra but pointing out that economic 
development is frequently a necessary precondition for other types of 
human development (the same point is made more extensively in T.N. 
Srinivasan’s article, discussed below). Park emphasized the importance 
of new institutional economics to the discussion of how to achieve eco-
nomic development, while Tesar highlighted the potential for foreign 
direct investment to provide net benefits to both developed and develop-
ing countries. 
The second and third panels, moderated by Kenneth Dam and 
Robert Litan, focused on “the role of law and institutions in develop-
ment.” Jonathan Hiatt and Deborah Greenfield argue for the importance 
of core labor rights in world development. They claim that in order to 
persuade working people to assume the risk of the free market, the “new 
economy” needs to be managed in a way that lifts living standards 
around the world, rather than becoming a “race to the bottom” in envi-
ronmental protection, consumer protections and labor standards. They 
call on the WTO and the International Labor Organization to commit to 
work together to ensure that free trade proceeds within a framework of 
respect for core labor standards, such as freedom of association, elimina-
tion of compulsory and child labor, and a ban on discrimination in 
employment. Hiatt and Greenfield cite the cases of bilateral U.S. agree-
ments with Cambodia and Jordan as examples of successful incorporation 
of core labor standards into trade agreements. 
David Kennedy’s contribution7 poses a challenge to the prevalent 
rhetoric that focuses on the importance of legal factors in development. 
Kennedy argues that this frequently serves as a way of avoiding a discus-
sion of the political and distributive choices attending the development 
process by linking it to a supposedly “neutral” rule of law paradigm. In 
particular, Kennedy challenges the value of two common ideas of the 
“new” law and development movement; the importance of formalizing 
legal entitlements and of fighting corruption, which in both cases lead to 
enshrining a particular distributive outcome. Instead, Kennedy calls for 
viewing the legal regime as a site for contestation and experimentation 
by paying attention to the distributive and political results of different 
legal regimes. 
Kerry Rittich’s article, The Future of Law and Development: Second 
Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the ‘Social’, distinguishes 
current efforts to discuss development from earlier ones by the explicit 
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attempt to incorporate social, structural, and human dimensions into the 
agenda of the international financial institutions. Rittich argues that we 
can learn a lot about the fate of this type of “second generation” reforms 
by examining how they are operationalized through legal rules and insti-
tutions. While the legal and institutional architecture of development 
does not appear to have substantially changed, the World Bank does at-
tempt to incorporate social justice concerns such as human rights, gender 
equality and labor standards into the development agenda. 
T. N. Srinivasan’s article focuses on the political economy of ensur-
ing both greater access to industrial country markets and a rule-based 
and transparent global system of trade and finance that guarantees such 
access. He argues that progress in this regard depends largely on domes-
tic events in a few large industrialized countries, and that declarations 
such as the Millennium Development Goals or the “right to develop-
ment” have only limited operational significance. Moreover, the potency 
of development assistance as a lever to bring about sustainable reforms 
in developing countries is overrated. Finally, Srinivasan argues that it is a 
mistake to ignore the tremendous variance across developing countries, 
especially because much of the needed changes in polity, society, and 
institutions to promote development are domestic and not external. It is 
possible, however, to make some valid generalizations, and one of them 
is that the legal system of a country has both an intrinsic value and an 
instrumental role in promoting (or retarding) development. 
The wide ranging article by Michael Trebilcock and his colleagues 
responds to some of T.N. Srinivasan’s challenges by addressing the po-
litical economy of rule of law reform in developing countries. Trebilcock 
et al. develop a “procedural conception” of the rule of law, thereby at-
tempting to bypass the debates about whether the rule of law is based on 
instrumental or deontological normative theories. This procedural con-
ception is based on six elements: the judiciary; access to justice; 
prosecutors; police and other law enforcement officials; the penal sys-
tem; and tax administration. These elements are first analyzed generally 
and then applied to Latin American and central and Eastern European 
countries. The authors conclude that despite much effort, “the promise of 
rule of law reform is proving exceedingly difficult to fulfill.” The prob-
lem resides not in technical impediments, but rather in social, cultural, 
and historical issues, and even more so in political economy factors. 
That is, elites block reform. The authors make a series of practical rec-
ommendations to enhance the likelihood of durable rule of law reforms, 
such as harnessing political pressure by certain domestic and foreign 
interest groups, and by foreign governments and international organiza-
tions. 
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Kevin Davis’ piece complements the pessimistic analysis by Trebil-
cock et al. by asking: What does the rule of law variable measure? Davis 
argues that optimistic claims about the extent to which legal reforms can 
play a causal role in development by reference to country-wide statistical 
analyses are misguided because in many cases the variables that are used 
to measure characteristics of the legal system do not capture information 
about aspects of that system that are amenable to reform. For example, 
variables that measure legal heritage, respect for the rule of law, respect 
for property rights, and enforceability of contracts may measure both 
legal and non-legal aspects of a society; to the extent they measure legal 
institutions, they aggregate information about the characteristics of sev-
eral types of institutions. Consequently, Davis argues that studies based 
upon these data can provide little or no guidance on the relationship be-
tween legal reforms and development. 
Katharina Pistor and her colleagues present an empirical analysis of 
“legal institutions and international trade flows.” In earlier work, they 
presented a model in which higher institutional quality gave rise to com-
parative advantage in complex goods production, while countries with 
weak legal institutions are typically “stuck” with exporting simple prod-
ucts. In this article, Pistor et al. extend the model to generate predictions 
about the effect of domestic institutions as well as trade barriers, export 
subsidies and import tariffs on trade flows. They find that countries with 
higher institutional quality experience greater trade flows, and that the 
quality of legal institutions is significantly more important for exporters 
than for importers. Moreover, the quality of legal institutions is of little 
importance for exporters of simple goods, but greatly important for ex-
porters of complex goods. They develop a tentative explanation for these 
findings based on the relative ability of traders in different types of 
goods to opt out or contract around defective legal institutions. 
On a more specific level, Katherine Terell examines the impact of 
minimum wage legislation in Costa Rica, which has both a “covered” 
sector (in which minimum wages apply) and an “uncovered” sector. She 
finds that legal minimum wages have a significant positive effect on 
wages of workers in the covered sector, but none in the uncovered sector; 
and that minimum wages have a negative impact on both employment 
and hours worked in the covered sector. Both effects are most significant 
in the lower half of the worker distribution. 
Daniel Kaufmann delivered a keynote address8 demonstrating 
through a wide range of empirical evidence that good governance mat-
ters to development. Key elements of governance include rule of law, 
honest government, efficiency of the regulatory regime, and democratic 
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accountability. Kaufmann highlighted the difficulties of anti-corruption 
campaigns that fail to look at the myriad ways in which corruption is 
institutionalized in a society. 
The fourth panel, moderated by Michael Barr, focused on “policy 
priorities for development.” John Braithwaite’s article Methods of Power 
for Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong uses 
regulatory theory to explain how American power works in the world 
system by networking corporate and state power with power in civil so-
ciety. Braithwaite argues that contrary to common perceptions, the 
United States is in fact reluctant to fire the big guns that underwrite its 
realist power; instead, it usually has its way through dialogue led by ana-
lytically sophisticated experts. This type of power can be used by 
developing countries as well, because they can sometimes enlist the cor-
porations and NGOs of the rich nations to defect to their cause. For 
example, poor nations can threaten to use their big stick of refusing to 
repay large debts owed to the rich nations’ banks. More broadly, devel-
oping countries can work together to display a responsive enforcement 
pyramid of networked governance to achieve the same kinds of power 
that usually accrue to developed ones.  
Steven Radelet’s article, A Framework for Supporting Sustained 
Economic Development, explores some of the similarities across low-
income countries that have achieved success in economic development 
since 1960. Radelet identifies twenty-one countries that were relatively 
poor in 1960 and have recorded economic growth of at least 2.2% per 
person per year (the maximum forty year average of the United States 
ever recorded in its history), along with significant increases in life ex-
pectancy and declines in infant mortality and illiteracy. Four core 
elements stand out as being consistent across these countries: macroeco-
nomic and political stability; significant investments in health and 
education; a reasonable environment for the private sector; and relatively 
strong governance. While these factors are primarily the responsibility of 
developing country governments, Radelet argues that the international 
community can help by increasing the quantity and quality of foreign 
assistance and granting greater access to markets in industrialized coun-
tries. 
Lael Brainard’s comments9 focused on the extent to which U.S. pol-
icy interests drive aid. She noted that concerns over HIV/AIDs, security 
in the wake of September 11, and a desire for making aid conditional on 
policy reforms were paramount at present. She noted that both U.S. pol-
icy and that of the multilateral development banks employed inconsistent 
standards for conditionality. 
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Michael Barr’s article, Microfinance and Financial Development, 
asks to what extent can a focus on microfinance make it more likely that 
financial development can lead to poverty alleviation. Barr argues that 
focusing on microfinance might help for four reasons: First, microfi-
nance institutions themselves might increasingly reach financial self-
sustainability and attract private capital flows to their mission of poverty 
alleviation, although reaching financial self sustainability and scale has 
proved elusive for many microfinance institutions. Second, microfinance 
institutions might “grow up in the cracks between the cement blocks of 
bad government”; they could help grow domestic credit demand and al-
leviate poverty despite weak legal and political institutions and so might 
be a particularly appropriate target for donor support in such countries. 
Third, microfinance institutions can help bridge the gap between the 
formal (banking) sector and informal lending markets, helping to com-
plete fragmented domestic markets. Fourth, microfinance could 
contribute to domestic demand for better governmental and market insti-
tutions, and focusing on the needs of a growing microfinance sector may 
lead domestic entities (including the government) to respond by 
strengthening the institutions needed for broad-based financial develop-
ment, such as credit information clearinghouses. 
The focus of the fifth panel, chaired by Rob Howse, was on the role 
of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in development. Carlos 
Correa examines investment protection in bilateral and free trade agree-
ments and its implications for the granting of compulsory licenses. He 
argues that while developing countries have entered into a large number 
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements that 
provide for investment protection, there is no evidence indicating that the 
adoption of BITs has actually encouraged FDI flows to the signing de-
veloping countries. At the same time, the broad definition of protected 
“investment” in BITs to include intellectual property rights may under-
mine the rights secured by developing countries under the WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) to grant compulsory licenses, as such licenses might constitute 
an expropriation entitling the holder of the patent to compensation under 
the BITs. 
Kevin Hasset focuses on the role of FDI in development. He argues 
that there is a broad consensus that FDI is a key component of trade and 
exerts a positive impact on development, primarily in the form of in-
creased wages for skilled workers, leading to an incentive for the 
developing countries to invest in human capital. Hasset further argues 
that tax rates have a significant correlation with FDI and that as the cor-
porate tax rate of a country declines, both investment as a percentage of 
8
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GDP and real GDP per capita growth rate increase. Thus, developing 
countries should consider tax policy reforms to attract capital flows in 
their direction.10  
Susan Esserman’s comments11 focused on the “impossibly high” ex-
pectations of developing countries for progress on development coming 
out of the Doha round of trade talks. She also discussed the role of the 
WTO Appellate Body in preserving political compromises that keep de-
veloping countries engaged in the world trading system. 
The sixth and final panel, moderated by Reuven Avi-Yonah, focused 
on financing development. Abdel Hamid Bouab’s comment, The Mon-
terrey Consensus: Achievements and Prospects, summarizes the 
conclusions of the international conference on financing for development 
held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March, 2002. The Monterrey Consensus 
incorporated six elements of financing for development: mobilizing do-
mestic financial resources; mobilizing international resources including 
FDI and other private flows; using international trade as an engine for 
development; increasing international financial and technical coopera-
tion for development; reducing external debt; and enhancing the 
coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and 
trading systems in support of development.  
Anthony Clunies-Ross’ article, Development Finance: Beyond 
Budgetary ODA, argues that budgetary appropriations by rich country 
governments are likely to prove inadequate to meet the estimated exter-
nal finance needed for the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals. Clunies-Ross argues that the focus instead should be on those 
methods that currently present the softest targets on the ground and as to 
which there are no coherent and legitimate interests ranged against. The 
most promising candidates are various forms of international tax coop-
eration, the resumption of regular allocation by the IMF of Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs), and the creation of an SDR denominated bond 
designed for preserving the assets of poor migrant workers and their 
families. In addition, Clunies-Ross suggests two ways of increasing the 
resources available to international organizations for use on behalf of the 
world community: recycling of SDRs that have no net value to the coun-
tries initially receiving them; and internationally coordinated taxes on 
world resources, activities, or externalities, such as a tax on currency 
transactions.   
Reuven Avi-Yonah’s article, Bridging the North/South Divide: Inter-
national Redistribution and Tax Competition, argues that finding ways to 
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help bridge the North/South divide in terms of life expectancy, health, 
and living conditions may be the most important task facing humanity at 
the beginning of the 21st century. The Millennium Development Goals 
adopted by the UN are a beginning step toward that goal, and require 
additional funding of about $50 billion per year (over existing aid). 
However, Avi-Yonah agrees with Clunies-Ross that under current condi-
tions it seems extremely unlikely that democratic approval can be given 
in developed countries to such an increase in aid, and certainly not to the 
level of redistribution required to bridge the gaps. Nor are new methods 
of financing such as the Tobin Tax on currency transactions (favored by 
Clunies-Ross) likely to be enacted given the opposition in the developed 
world. In these circumstances, the best policy approach is for the devel-
oped countries to help developing countries help themselves. In order to 
do that, the developed countries need to restrict harmful tax competition 
among developing countries, and competition to attract flight capital 
from developing countries to developed countries.  
Michael Littlewood’s article, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 
takes the contrary position to Avi-Yonah’s in the tax competition debate. 
Littlewood argues that the theory that tax competition by developing 
countries to attract FDI is harmful is unproven; that even if it is harmful, 
it does not follow that it would be desirable to stop it; and that, in any 
event, stopping it poses practical difficulties which have yet to be re-
solved. 
Conclusions 
These articles present a wide range of views on a broad range of top-
ics related to globalization, development, and the law. It may be 
possible, however, to draw some tentative conclusions about areas of 
agreement and disagreement. 
First, there is broad agreement that increasing development and re-
ducing the gap between developed and developing countries is an 
important goal. Moreover, the economists (e.g., T.N. Srinivasan) tend to 
agree with the development experts (e.g., Malhotra) that development 
should be defined broadly to include more than increasing GDP, al-
though there may be some disagreement about whether economic 
development is or is not a necessary precondition to other forms of de-
velopment, and what consequences follow from the definition. 
Second, there is broad agreement that globalization can in principle 
be helpful for development, as long as it is managed correctly, and that a 
retreat from globalization like that which occurred in the 1920s would be 
unfortunate. There is considerable disagreement, however, about what 
10
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needs to be done to ensure that globalization in fact helps development. 
On the one hand, economists like Srinivasan and Hassett argue that the 
problem is governmental rules like tariffs and taxes that hinder the free 
flow of trade and investment, which would most favor development. On 
the other hand, Kuttner, Hiatt, and Rittich argue that a “mixed economy” 
model incorporating domestic labor standards, consumer protections, 
and environmental protections should be developed for the global econ-
omy. Terrell’s article complements this debate by showing both the pros 
and the cons of adopting a developed country idea like the minimum 
wage in a developing country context. 
Third, there is a general consensus that legal institutions and good 
governance are important for both managing globalization and achieving 
development, and that these institutions go beyond “law” or “policy” to 
encompass the basic structures of society itself. Unfortunately, as Trebil-
cock, Pistor, Davis, and their colleagues all point out, such institutions 
may be difficult to change. Moreover, it is not at all clear that these insti-
tutions are responsive to change from external forces. One problem is 
that these institutions are intimately linked to particular distributive out-
comes and therefore attempts to change them may run into significant 
political opposition, as Srinivasan argues. Radelet’s article, however, is 
more optimistic in pointing out that several developing countries have 
succeeded in achieving high rates of growth over a long period by adopt-
ing good policies and sound governance. Moreover, Braithwaite’s article 
makes it clear that in an interconnected world, developing countries can 
sometimes benefit from institutional links that were formed by devel-
oped countries. In addition, Barr shows that sometimes positive 
institutional growth can occur in developing countries in spite of the 
weakness of governmental frameworks. 
Fourth, there is agreement that the current architecture of globaliza-
tion can in some ways be improved if it is to work in the interests of 
development. Thus, Correa points to defects in the BIT network from a 
developing country perspective. Many discussants at the conference 
noted the problem of sovereign debt crises and the need for international 
mechanisms to help resolve these with greater success, with solutions 
ranging from market adoption of collective action clauses, to an interna-
tional bankruptcy court, to “dollarization” as a way to minimize currency 
risk. Similarly, Rittich recommends incorporating broad development 
issues into the agenda of the global financial institutions. 
Finally, there is a general consensus that more financial resources 
are needed for development, and that official development assistance 
increases are unlikely to be forthcoming in sufficient amounts, as argued 
by Bouab, Clunies-Ross, and Avi-Yonah. There is disagreement,  
11
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however, on a range of alternative measures that could be used for addi-
tional financing, such as the Tobin Tax (espoused by Clunies-Ross, while 
Avi-Yonah is skeptical), limits on tax competition to attract FDI (es-
poused by Avi-Yonah, while Littlewood is skeptical and Hassett 
opposed), or creative financing through the IMF. 
We hope that the conference, and the papers in this issue, will con-
tribute to the debate over how to best promote development in an age of 
globalization. In our personal view, both the advocates for globalization, 
and the protestors on the streets of Seattle, ought to share this goal. But 
how to get there is a rightly contested, and contestable, question. 
12
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